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INTRODUCTION
Call it the trillions that time forgot. Shining fortresses filled with
gold and teeming with human activity dot the American landscape.
Within them, much is produced to benefit the nation. Overseers
enjoy prestige and prosperity, and minions security and purpose.
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Outside their gates, society’s reverence is made tangible by regular
custom and lavish tribute.
These fortresses are not feudal castles, grand cathedrals, or even
great universities. They are emphatically not churning factories,
although they are businesses. They are America’s hospitals and
clinics—the industrial engines of U.S. health care.1 And most are both
out of time and out of place.
Pushing $4 trillion annually, and employing millions of people
in most communities in every state, health care represents one-sixth
of the American economy. 2 Only the automobile industry in its
heyday during the 1950s and 1960s rivaled modern health care’s
centrality to peacetime domestic production and employment. 3
In 2017, large economic sectors tend to share common features.4
Ownership is separated from control. Goods and capital move freely.
Production is global and automated. Entry barriers have dropped.
Products come assembled. Prices are low, as is inflation. Consumers
matter. On the downside, domestic employment has slowed, and the

See ROSEMARY STEVENS, IN SICKNESS AND IN WEALTH: AMERICAN HOSPITALS IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 40–46, 351–52 (1999) (asserting that not-for-profit hospitals have
been profit-maximizing enterprises).
2 Sean P. Keehan et al., National Health Expenditure Projections, 2016–25: Price Increases,
Aging Push Sector To 20 Percent of Economy, 36 HEALTH AFF. 3553 (2017).
3 Transportation in 1965 and health care in 1995 were similar in several ways: same
shares of GDP, shares of employment, degrees of private control, high rates of
avoidable death, and cultures of individual responsibility. See JERRY L. MASHAW &
DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 50 (1990) (describing the cultural
and economic power of the auto industry during its heyday).
4 For a persuasive description of globalization, see THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD
IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2005).
1
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rewards of production accrue mainly to senior executives and
wealthy investors.5
Health care is different, a throwback. 6 Ownership is either
captive to or fused with control. Capital is hindered both entering
and leaving. Entry barriers are substantial, even as consolidation
accelerates. Technology seldom increases productivity. Trade is
restricted and little production occurs offshore. Products are offered
piecemeal at high and rising prices, often paid by intermediaries with
faint consumer voice. But job growth is pronounced, and the
artisanal and managerial classes prosper. Only higher education
seems remotely similar, though (reproductive rights aside) health
care has for the most part been spared parallel accusations of secular
elitism.
Health care’s privileged status imposes an unacceptable social
cost. Sheltered by conscious if incremental public policy—including
selective subsidies, entry restrictions, tax preferences, and
protectionist professional self-governance—an estimated $1 trillion
each year is sacrificed in care that is overpriced, wasteful, useless, or
harmful.7 At the same time, inattention to poverty, lack of education,
and other “social determinants” of health compromises economic
productivity and civic engagement, and adds substantially to the
nation’s medical bill.8

For an analysis of economic inequality and wage stagnation, see THOMAS PIKETTY,
CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014).
6 Cf. Susan Dentzer, It’s Past Time to Get Serious About Transforming Care, 32 HEALTH
AFF. 6, 6 (2013) (“One eternal mystery of US health care is why patients and payers
have been loath to demand attributes they take for granted in other sectors of the
economy, such as convenience, price transparency, and reasonable costs.”).
7 INST. OF MED., BEST CARE AT LOWER COST: THE PATH TO CONTINUOUSLY LEARNING
HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 38 (Mark Smith et al. eds., 2013).
8 See generally ELIZABETH H. BRADLEY & LAUREN A. TAYLOR, THE AMERICAN HEALTH
CARE PARADOX: WHY SPENDING MORE IS GETTING US LESS (2015) (discussing US lack
of social investment); RICHARD COOPER, POVERTY AND THE MYTHS OF HEALTH CARE
REFORM (2016) (arguing that poverty, not clinical uncertainty, explains geographic
5
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But there is more to this story than a plea for deregulation and
the efficiency gains that would accompany it. The wealth trapped
within American health care is simultaneously a tragedy and a
miracle. It is a tragedy because stagnating wages, widening
disparities in income, ballooning deficits, and stunted investments in
education and social services make such medical profligacy
shameful. It is a miracle because it still exists, whereas other
resources of similar magnitude have already been dissipated without
addressing any of the aforementioned failings—indeed, sometimes
having contributed to them. It therefore can be released and used.
It is time to “frack” the health care system and innovate the demedicalization of America. The catchphrase for this effort is
assuredly not “Repeal and Replace,” the Republican party’s
oversimplified solution to the overblown criticism it continues to
level against the Affordable Care Act. A better mantra is “Recover
and Repurpose”—releasing the value trapped in our
underperforming health care system and directing it toward more
individually and socially productive ends. Significantly, this turns
out to be a more complex and contextual project than putting one’s
faith in freedom and markets, although freedom and markets play a
central role.
With careful planning and responsible execution, recovering and
repurposing the trillions of dollars being spent on low-value
medicine can set an example for policy-makers of an economic
transition that offers broad distributive and communal benefits as
well as efficiency gains. The current condition of American politics
compels such an approach. Cast in its best light, the cleavage
revealed by the 2016 election cycle was not between the individual

variations in health care); Raj Chetty et al., The Association between Income and Life
Expectancy in the United States, 2001-2014, 315 JAMA 1750 (2016).

2017]

FRACKING HEALTH CARE

639

and the collective, or even between choice and coercion, but between
re-invention and restoration. Moreover, the restorative forces made
it clear that becoming “great again” meant recapturing many of the
qualities that health care aberrantly if expensively has retained: jobs,
nativism, regional fairness, paternalism, and trust.
I.

TAKING LIBERTIES: THE WELFARE PECULIARITIES OF U.S.
HEALTH CARE

Analyzing the social welfare implications of health policy can be
a messy endeavor. As Kenneth Arrow observed half a century ago,
distributional decisions in health care often are inseparable from
efficiency calculations.9 Personal liberties intermingle with physical
and emotional vulnerabilities. 10 Communal and collective
commitments, often over long periods of time, establish the
conditions under which individuals face health challenges and
respond to them.11 All of these considerations are routinely subject to
political forces, which at different times may be ecumenical,
ideological, crisis-driven, or narrowly self-interested.12
It is often tempting, for example, to equate marketplace conduct
with individual freedom in parsing a policy choice. 13 Markets are
composed of voluntary transactions, and clear when buyers

Kenneth Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON.
REV. 941, 965 (1963). For a more recent collection of commentaries on Arrow’s analysis,
see UNCERTAIN TIMES: KENNETH ARROW AND THE CHANGING ECONOMICS OF HEALTH
CARE (Peter J. Hammer et al. eds., 2003).
10 CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY: PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND
MEDICAL DECISIONS (1998) (explaining preferences for medical beneficence).
11 See Rachel Rebouche & Scott Burris, The Social Determinants of Health, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTHCARE LAW 1097 (I. Glenn Cohen et al. eds., 2016).
12 See generally PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (2d
ed. 2017) (exploring the American medical profession’s centuries-long interactions
with government).
13 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH
CARE (1997) (arguing both liberty and efficiency).
9

640

New York University Journal of Law & Liberty [Vol. 11:635

subjectively value potential purchases at higher amounts than the
prices sellers charge for them. Voluntary exchange often implies
allocative efficiency, but not always. Notably, “free markets” in
American medicine have been anything but, driving a wedge
between commercial activity and personal autonomy in far more
than just the exceptional situations of commoditized personhood that
tend to concern bioethicists and prompt legal restrictions on
contracting and alienation.14
The public finds itself defending and conflating two flawed
versions of health care liberty. In one, the autonomy of the individual
is represented by the ability to choose a physician (the specific
designation of a member of the licensed medical profession being
deliberate) and the decisional freedom of that physician once
selected. 15 Collective policy decisions that alter conditions for
physicians, even indirectly, are therefore perceived as threats to
individuals, notwithstanding a multi-generational critique of
medical bias and paternalism. As a result, public policy that modifies
health care financing or delivery, even at an aggregate level, becomes
vulnerable to an “identified life” objection because the public
imagines it constraining a physician caring for a parent, spouse, or

See William M. Sage, Assembled Products: The Key to More Effective Competition and
Antitrust Oversight in Health Care, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 609 (2016) (explaining the
constitutive role of regulation in health care delivery). See also ROBERT I. FIELD, MOTHER
OF INVENTION: HOW THE GOVERNMENT CREATED FREEMARKET HEALTH CARE 24 (2014)
(discussing the crucial role of public initiatives in private health care); CLARK C.
HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS INSTRUMENTS OF
HEALTH CARE (1995); EPSTEIN, supra note 13.
15 Charles D. Weller, Free Choice as a Restraint of Trade in American Health Care Delivery
and Insurance, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1351, 1392 (1984) (noting the potential for market power
from unconstrained choice of physician).
14
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child. 16 In the health reform debate of the 1990s, for example,
preserving the public’s ability to choose a health insurer—which, at
the time, were mainly financing entities—became a rallying cry for
opponents of the Clinton proposal because it served as a political
proxy for measures that might eventually limit choice of physician. 17
Similarly, the expansion of private managed care raised concerns
over its potential to compromise or negate physician independence,
a strand of resistance that persists in the continuing emotional
exchanges over the ACA’s alleged but apocryphal “death panels.” 18
In the second version of health care liberty, false cognates to
market competition and informed consumerism reinforce the
majority’s preference for decentralized medical policymaking. As
health care spending has risen dramatically over the last several
decades, the circularity in public debate that fact provokes is
understandable. Should we treat health care as a market because it is
so expensive, or is it so expensive because we treat it as a market? 19
U.S. health care mimics the commercial economy in its transactional

Although the distinction is not without its critics, regulatory decisions that alter
conditions so as to increase the probability of physical harm in a population
(“statistical lives”) are subjected to a different cost-benefit calculus than decisions
whose victims are known (“identified lives”). See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, The Rights of
Statistical People, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 189–207 (2000).
17 E.g., Elizabeth McCaughey, No Exit, NEW REPUBLIC (Feb. 7, 1994), https://newrepu
blic.com/article/69935/no-exit (equating rationing under the Clinton reform with
private managed care).
18 See Peter Ubel, Why It Is So Difficult to Kill the Death Panel Myth, FORBES (Jan. 9, 2013,
12:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterubel/2013/01/09/why-it-is-so-diffic
ult-to-kill-the-deathpanel-myth/. The supposed “death panel” rule was merely a
provision permitting Medicare to pay for conversations between patients and their
physicians about end-of-life care.
19 For similar complaints about the current health care system but different
perspectives on the role of market competition, compare REGINA HERZLINGER, WHO
KILLED HEALTH CARE? AMERICA'S $2 TRILLION MEDICAL PROBLEM—AND THE
CONSUMER-DRIVEN CURE (2007) (embracing market-driven consumer choice), with
JEROME P. KASSIRER, ON THE TAKE: HOW MEDICINE'S COMPLICITY WITH BIG BUSINESS
CAN ENDANGER YOUR HEALTH (2004) (criticizing the profit incentives in health care).
16
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basis—with billions of “claims” paid annually by self-insured
employers, health insurers, and individuals—as well as its reliance
on branded private organizations, its proliferation of new
technologies, and its assertions of unrivaled quality to justify its very
high prices. 20 The workforce specialization that accompanies a
claims-oriented conception of medical progress has also altered the
character of therapeutic relationships between expert physicians and
their patients, bonds that traditionally placed medicine in a private,
familial space.21 For most Americans facing illness, a physician has
become less a trusted friend than a personal shopper prescribing,
referring, admitting, and ordering goods and services supplied and
often provided by others.22
As discussed below, however, these purchases in many instances
reflect simulated market competition, not the real thing. Freedom to
engage in distorted transactions is not efficient, nor does it further
non-commercial autonomy (medical or otherwise). For example,
neglecting the social determinants of health, sacrificing educational

In 2015, U.S. health plans processed 5.4 billion transactions. 2016 CAQH INDEX, A
REPORT OF HEALTHCARE INDUSTRY ADOPTION OF ELECTRONIC BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS
AND COST SAVINGS (2016), https:// www.caqh.org /sites /default/files/explor
ations/index/report/2016-caqh-index-report.pdf
21 Many commentators have attributed high health care costs in part to excessive
physician specialization. See, e.g., David C. Goodman & Elliott S. Fisher, Physician
Workforce Crisis? Wrong Diagnosis, Wrong Prescription, 358 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1658
(2008). Managed care “gatekeeping” requirements were intended to discourage
specialist consultation and the expensive services that were then ordered.
22 Health policy experts generally agree that the “physician’s pen” is the most
expensive medical technology in the world. Cf. Louis Goodman & Timothy Norbeck,
Who’s to Blame for Our Rising Healthcare Costs?, FORBES (Apr. 3, 2013, 9:31 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/04/03/whos-to-blame-for-our-rising
healthcare-costs/ [https://perma.cc/5Q9T-E4SK] (citing 80% as a “frequently used
number” for the percentage of health care costs that is directed by physicians).
20
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spending in favor of overpriced medical care, and forsaking cash
wages in order to fund overpriced, often ineffective health insurance
benefits hardly seem conducive to the exercise of individual liberty.
Parallel tensions and ambiguities affect redistribution. America’s
redistributive commitments with respect to health care are
substantial, but are mediated by its bloated health care industry. 23 As
in-kind support for essential needs or circumstances beyond the
recipient’s control, health care fits well with taxpayers’ overall
paternalism regarding redistribution. Nonetheless, political
preferences reinforced by fiscal accounting practices limit public
generosity with respect to explicit taxation and entitlement spending,
which are reserved for favored constituencies such as the elderly
(Medicare), children (SCHIP), and categories of “deserving poor”
(pre-expansion Medicaid).24 Additional redistribution in the health
care system takes place privately and implicitly within hospitals and
medical practices 25 —which resist cost pressures partly on this
basis—and through the mixed risk pools prevalent in employmentbased health coverage.26

COOPER, supra note 8; Laurence R. Jacobs, Politics of America’s Supply State: Health
Reform and Technology, 14 HEALTH AFF. 143 (1995) (describing the primacy of
generating supply over ensuring access in US health policy).
24 See Amy L. Wax, Rethinking Welfare Rights: Reciprocity Norms, Reactive Attitudes, and
the Political Economy of Welfare Reform, 63 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 257 (Winter/Spring
2000); Theodore R. Marmor & Jerry L. Mashaw, Understanding Social Insurance:
Fairness, Affordability, and the ‘Modernization’ of Social Security and Medicare, 25 HEALTH
AFF. 114, 117 (2006).
25 The amount of “cost-shifting” to uncompensated care is contestable. See Teresa A.
Coughlin et al., Uncompensated Care for the Uninsured in 2013: A Detailed Examination
(May 30, 2014), http://kff.org/report-section/uncompensated-care-for-the-uninsur
ed-in-2013-a-detailed-examination-cost-shifting-and-remaining-uncompensated-care
-costs-8596/ (estimating cost-shifting at 4.6% of private health insurance premiums).
26 David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health Insurance, 2
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 23 (2001).
23
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The lobbying muscle of provider and supplier constituencies
boosts these charitable impulses, and channels them into payments
for goods and services. Medicare and Medicaid eligibility and benefit
standards, and those programs’ anti-discrimination rules, exert
major redistributive force. 27 As a result, U.S. hospital expenditures
on the poor surpassed spending on the non-poor around 1980, as the
spending effects of ill health arising from poverty and increasingly
expensive medical services delivered in commercial settings
overcame the financial constraints usually placed on welfare benefit
programs.28
Filtering so much social policy through publicly subsidized
medical commerce is doubly inflationary because the “medicalindustrial complex” is not counterbalanced by a national politics of
health that asserts a need for collective restraint and pushes back
against special interests claiming more than their fair share of
resources. 29 As Jacobs observed in the 1990s, social solidarity in
European countries has made universal access to health care an
expression of patriotism, necessitating limits on supply to assure
sustainability. 30 The United States, by contrast, prioritizes the
development of new medical products and services, with only a

Bruce C. Vladeck, The Political Economy of Medicare, HEALTH AFF., Jan./Feb. 1999, at
22, 23–24; LAURA KATZ OLSON, THE POLITICS OF MEDICAID (2014).
28 COOPER, supra note 8, at 9.
29 William M. Sage, Minding Ps and Qs: The Political and Policy Questions Framing Health
Care Spending, 44 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 559, 559–60 (2016) (substituting “health care” for
“military” in Eisenhower’s address). See also BARBARA EHRENREICH, THE AMERICAN
HEALTH EMPIRE: POWER, PROFITS, AND POLITICS (1970) (warning of the “medicalindustrial complex”); President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Address to the
Nation (Jan. 17, 1961), https://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/All_About_Ike/Speec
hes/Farewell_Address.pdf.
30 Jacobs, supra note 23, at 145.
27
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secondary commitment to financing access to that supply for the
underserved. 31
There is no health policy nationalism here. 32 Even under the
ACA, the closest that the U.S. seems to get to a citizen-focused health
policy is a consumerist one.33 President Obama’s remarks after the
most recent Supreme Court decision upholding his own program are
telling: “There’s no card that says “Obamacare” when you enroll. But
that’s by design, for this has never been a government takeover of
health care, despite cries to the contrary. This reform remains what
it’s always been: a set of fairer rules and tougher protections that
have made health care in America more affordable, more attainable,
and more about you—the consumer, the American people.”34
In sum, access to the health care “system” (a word we use
unabashedly even in the United States) is not granted as an attribute
of citizenship or residence, nor is it funded collectively through
general tax revenues. But neither does it remotely resemble an
unfettered market, and policymakers deceive themselves and the
public when they defend it on that basis. Both emotionally and
financially, our very costly yet non-universal health care system

Id.
William M. Sage, Solidarity, in CONNECTING AMERICAN VALUES WITH AMERICAN
HEALTH CARE REFORM 10–22 (Thomas H. Murray and Mary Crowley, eds. 2009).
33 See William M. Sage, Relational Duties, Regulatory Duties, and the Widening Gap
Between Individual Health Law and Collective Health Policy, 96 GEO. L.J. 497 (2008)
(making the case for a more collective, population-oriented approach to health system
governance); William M. Sage, Why the Affordable Care Act Needs a Better Name:
“Americare”, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1496 (2010) (criticizing the ACA failure to build a shared
identity around health and health care).
34 President Barack Obama, Remarks in the Rose Garden of the White House on the
Supreme Court’s Decision in King v. Burwell (June 25, 2015), https://www.usnews
.com/news/articles/2015/06/25/president-barack-obamas-full-statement-on-supre
me-court-affordable-care-act-ruling
31
32
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crowds out other individual and shared commitments. 35 As a result,
rather than being addressed more cheaply and effectively by other
means, many social problems in the U.S. are “medicalized” because
doing so confers a priority claim on national resources.36 The U.S.
health care system may not resemble Western Europe’s compulsory
insurance or the UK’s National Health Service (NHS), but it is our
own version of socialized medicine nonetheless—for which we
individually and collectively pay a steep price.
II. HOLDING BACK THE TIDE: SOURCES OF HEALTH CARE
INERTIA
Writing in the late 1990s about his hometown of Pittsburgh,
former Medicare administrator Bruce Vladeck recalled a recent visit
during which it struck him that the great steel mills and factories of
his youth had been replaced in the local economy by giant hospitals.
But his self-described epiphany went further: “It’s not just health care
that is now the largest industry in Pittsburgh. The largest industry in
Pittsburgh is Medicare.”37 This shift in U.S. economic production has
not slowed: a 2017 New York Times article on the nation’s political
divisions quoted a Trump supporter on the disappearance of

For an authoritative analysis of the relationship between spending on medical care
and spending on social services, see ELIZABETH H. BRADLEY & LAUREN A. TAYLOR, THE
AMERICAN HEALTH CARE PARADOX: WHY SPENDING MORE IS GETTING US LESS (2015).
For the potential crowd-out effect on private wages, see David I. Auerbach & Arthur
L. Kellermann, A Decade of Health Care Cost Growth Has Wiped Out Real Income Gains for
an Average US Family, 30 HEALTH AFF. 1630, 1631 (2011).
36 See, e.g., THOMAS SZASZ, THE MANUFACTURE OF MADNESS (1970); Ivan Illich, The
Medicalization of Life, 1(2) J. MED. ETHICS 73 (1975); PETER CONRAD, THE
MEDICALIZATION OF SOCIETY: ON THE TRANSFORMATION OF HUMAN CONDITIONS INTO
MEDICAL DISORDERS (2007).
37 See Vladeck, supra note 27, at 23.
35
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traditional jobs in her Massachusetts community. The new industry,
she complained, “is medical, medical, medical.”38
Yet an astonishing amount of health care spending is plausibly
unnecessary. An Institute of Medicine (IOM) report issued in 2012,
Best Care at Lower Cost, attributed over $750 billion each year to
waste. 39 Of this amount, an estimated $210 billion reflects
unnecessary services, including overuse not justified by scientific
evidence, discretionary use beyond established benchmarks, and
unnecessary choice of higher-cost services. The IOM report identified
another $130 billion in inefficiently delivered services, including
medical errors, preventable complications, fragmented care,
unnecessary use of higher-cost providers, and operational
inefficiency at care delivery sites. Excess administrative costs
accounted for $190 billion, missed prevention opportunities for $55
billion, and fraud for $75 billion. The report’s final category, with
$105 billion in annual waste, was “Prices That Are Too High.”
Annual waste today very likely exceeds $1 trillion.
The undeserved prosperity of U.S. health care has not escaped
notice, particularly among economists and policymakers new to the
sector who have not yet become inured to unending medical
inflation. When Peter Orszag served as President Obama’s director
of the Office of Management and Budget after leading the
Congressional Budget Office, his excitement at the prospect of health
care reform was palpable.40 Orszag understood the long-term fiscal
drag from unnecessary health care spending, its distortionary effects
on the economy, and its likely role in reducing overall economic

Sabrina Tavernise, One Country Two Tribes, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/01/28/opinion/one-country-two-tribes.html?_r=0.
39 INST. FOR MED., BEST CARE AT LOWER COST: THE PATH TO CONTINUOUSLY LEARNING
HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 102 (Mark Smith et al. eds., 2012).
40 Peter Orszag, Healthcare is America’s Real Problem, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2013), https://
www.ft.com/content/3023caa2-63e3-11e2-84d8-00144feab49a.
38
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growth. Nowhere else, he speculated, could policy change
potentially generate national savings of more than a full percentage
point of GDP.41
The industrial profile of U.S. health care helps explain its
uniqueness in an increasingly automated, global, and unforgiving
economy. Begin with employment. According to the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS), health care and social assistance grew from
comprising 10.2% of U.S. employment in 2006 to 12.2% in 2016, with
the highest job growth rate of any industry sector.42 BLS now lists in
its data approximately 90 health care-related occupations. 43 More
Americans work in health care than in retail trade, and health care
employment is approaching that of professional and business
services, which have a substantially lower job growth rate; and state
and local government, which is not adding jobs at all.44
Health care output is growing rapidly as well, although (as
discussed above) the clinical value of health care goods and services
is often questionable. Six of the top seven industrial sectors with the
highest projected employment growth from 2016–2026 are within
“health and social services.” 45 In rank order, these included home
health care services, individual and family services, outpatient care

Peter Orszag, Director, Cong. Budget Off., Growth in Health Care Costs, Statement
before the Committee on the Budget, US Senate (Jan. 31, 2008), http://www.cbo
.gov/ftpdocs/89xx/doc8948/01-31-HealthTestimony.pdf.
42 See Employment by Major Industry Sector, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.g
ov/emp/ep_table_201.htm (last updated Oct. 24, 2017).
43 See Industry-Occupation Matrix Data, by Occupation, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT.,
https://www.bls.gov/emp/ep_table_108.htm (last updated Oct. 24, 2017).
44 BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., supra note 42.
45 See Industries with the Fastest Growing and Most Rapidly Declining Wage and Salary
Employment, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/emp/ep_table_203.htm
(last updated Oct. 24, 2017).
41
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centers, offices of other health practitioners, medical and diagnostic
laboratories, and other ambulatory health care services. Offices of
physicians and offices of dentists are listed among the top twenty
sectors.46
On the other hand, productivity gains in the health care industry
have been unimpressive. Health care output increases almost exactly
in proportion to employment.47 In U.S. manufacturing, by contrast,
output expanded by an average compound rate of 0.3% per year from
2006–2016 even as employment dropped by 1.4% per year. 48
Productivity increases are also substantially greater in many other
technology-driven service sectors than in health care. 49 Lack of
automation in health care delivery likely is a partial explanation for
its lackluster performance.
High wages are also a challenge to labor productivity in health
care, except for minimally trained staff such as nursing aides and
personal attendants, but high wages are obviously beneficial to
health care workers themselves. So are generous benefits. Of the
more than three million temporary and contract employees who
work in the U.S., only 9% work in health care—compared to 37%
working in industrial settings and 28% in office-based clerical and
administrative positions.50

Id.
See Employment and Output by Industry, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., https://www.bls
.gov/emp/ep_table_207.htm (last modified Oct. 24, 2017).
48 Id.
49 See Lucy Eldridge & Jennifer Price, Measuring Quarterly Labor Productivity by Sector,
MONTHLY LAB. REV. (June 27, 2016), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2016/article
/measuring-quarterly-labor-productivity-by-industry.htm [https://doi.org/10.21916
/mlr.2016.28].
50 See Staffing Industry Statistics, AM. STAFFING ASS’N, https://americanstaffing.net/sta
ffing-research-data/fact-sheets-analysis-staffing-industry-trends/staffing-industrystatistics/#tab:tbs_nav_item_0 (last visited Dec. 2, 2017).
46
47
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The physician professional class—nearly all of whom are frontline personnel rather than senior executives—is particularly wellpaid. Median incomes exceed $400,000 for orthopedic surgeons and
cardiologists; $300,000 for general surgeons, dermatologists, and
anesthesiologists; and $200,000 for pediatricians and family
physicians.51 Surprisingly, physicians in rural states such as North
Dakota tend to make the most. 52 With about 700,000 physicians in
active practice nationally, their earnings comprise a substantial
portion of overall U.S. labor costs. 53 In the aggregate based on 2008
data, physicians account for more salary dollars than any BLS
classification except “managers,” “chief executives” (including small
business owners), and registered nurses, all of whom work in
significantly larger numbers than do physicians. 54
Corporate structure in health care is also antiquated. In form if
not economic substance, many of the largest health care businesses
operate as non-profits. Most hospitals, even those in national chains
with hundreds of facilities, are chartered under state non-profit law
and are considered tax-exempt by the Internal Revenue Service. 55
Public investment in these organizations is limited to debt purchases
and charitable contributions. Physicians still typically own their

See Medscape Physician Compensation Report 2017, MEDSCAPE (Apr. 5, 2017), http://
www.medscape.com /slideshow/compensation-2017-overview-6008547.
52 Id.
53 See Dean Baker, The Problem of Doctors’ Salaries, POLITICO (Oct. 25, 2017),
https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/10/25/doctors-salaries-paydisparities-000557.
54 See Jennifer Cheeseman Day & Jeffrey Rosenthal, Detailed Occupations and Median
Earnings: 2008 (U.S. Census Bureau, Working Paper, 2008), https://www.census.gov
/content/dam/Census/library/working-papers/2008/demo/acs08-detailedoccupat
ions.pdf.
55 See Jill Horwitz, Nonprofit Healthcare Organizations and the Law, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTHCARE LAW 535 (I. Glenn Cohen et al. eds., 2016).
51
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medical practices or are employed by other physicians, although in
recent years significant numbers have become hospital employees.56
In addition, publicly traded entities or, more often, private equity
firms have begun to purchase and exploit ambulatory care facilities
and physician practice infrastructure.57
How did health care avoid the fate of other industries that have
increased productivity, automated, shifted production offshore,
undergone cycles of corporate restructuring, or come to rely on
temporary or low-wage workers? The observation that health care is
a service rather than manufacturing industry is true, but lacks much
explanatory power. 58 The argument that most health care remains
local is based largely on circular reasoning; health care’s intimacy
does not predict its cost, and its informational deficits and incentive
problems, while substantial, need not persist indefinitely.
Surprisingly, this question is typically overlooked amid the
ongoing enthusiasm for “delivery system redesign” and “valuebased care.” In general, when an industry has declared a trajectory
of change and has reached consensus on the methods to be
employed, improvement should be steady if not always rapid. This

See Robert Kocher & Nikhil R. Sahni, Hospitals’ Race to Employ Physicians—The Logic
Behind a Money-Losing Proposition, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1790 (2011).
57 The role of private investment in health care is not well known. See Clay Bischoff et
al., The Next Act in Healthcare Private Equity, MCKINSEY & CO. (Dec. 2016), http://
www.mckinsey.com/industries/private-equity-and-principal-investors/ourinsights/the-next-act-in-healthcare-private-equity.
58 Productivity in service industries may be more difficult to improve than in
manufacturing. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WILLIAM G. BOWEN, PERFORMING ARTS: THE
ECONOMIC DILEMMA 164 (1966) (observing, among other things, that one cannot easily
reduce the labor force in a string quartet). The relevance of service industry
productivity to health care spending has been widely noted. See, e.g., George Will,
‘Baumol’s Disease’ Explains Flagging Productivity, NAT. REV. (May 17, 2017),
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/447720/baumols-disease-productivityentitlements-problem-workforce-ages.
56
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happened in health care over a decade ago, but progress has been
glacial.
The principal explanation for why we are not “there yet” in the
pursuit of health care value lies in the dense thicket of accumulated
regulation, subsidy, and—above all—professional privilege that
constitutes the deep legal architecture of the health care system. 59
Political capture plays an important role in this story, particularly
regarding the substantial revenue streams that flow from public
coffers or enjoy the forbearance of tax collectors. 60 Beneath these
layers of self-interest and opportunism, however, is a medical
archetype that the U.S. embraced long ago and still aggressively
defends: a reliance on individual and collective professional
judgment that often pushes physicians’ expertise and ethics beyond
their breaking points and channels our accidental health care system
into the profligacy we now must confront and reverse. 61
Although centralized authority might have brought us to a
similar situation, American federalism has been a substantial enabler
of the “professional paradigm.”62 The federal government has served
largely as a funder: of insurance coverage through Medicare and

See generally William M. Sage, Relating Health Law to Health Policy: A Frictional
Account, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTHCARE LAW 3–28 (I. Glenn Cohen et al.
eds., 2016). The medical profession often feigns ignorance of its legal privilege. See,
e.g., William M. Sage, Over Under or Through: Physicians, Law, and Health Care Reform.
53 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L.J. 1033, 1033–34 (2009) (“For a physician to want regulation out of
medical licensing is as absurd as the oft-quoted saw about a senior citizen telling his
congressman to ‘keep the government out of my Medicare.’ ”) (noting the irony of a
leading physician claiming that government regulation has no place in medicine).
60 See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 27, at 26.
61 Rand E. Rosenblatt, The Four Ages of Health Law, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 155 (2004)
(describing the professional paradigm).
62 See Abigail R. Moncrieff & Joseph Lawless, Health Care Federalism, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTHCARE LAW 93 (I. Glenn Cohen et al. eds., 2016).
59
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Medicaid; of biomedical research, through NIH; of physician training
through Medicare; and of employer-based health coverage and taxexempt hospitals, through tax preferences. Federal health politics is
correspondingly dominated by spending, with the focused interests
seeking a particular payment typically proving more powerful than
the diffuse interests opposing it. Substantive regulation is often
appended to these revenue streams, but dominates in only a few
areas (e.g., FDA) and, in many instances, places health professionals
in powerful gatekeeping roles (e.g., the RUC that advises on
Medicare payments to physicians). 63
By contrast, states have been the principal regulators of health
care delivery. States license professionals and facilities, regulate
prescriptive authority, and define physician-hospital relations. 64
Many of these responsibilities have been delegated to the medical
profession with little state supervision, while even direct regulation
tends to be highly deferential to professional traditions and
associated political organizing. 65 Until recently, states also possessed
near-exclusive oversight of health insurance benefits, underwriting

For an overview of current FDA regulation, see Lewis A. Grossman, Drugs, Biologics,
and Devices: FDA Regulation, Intellectual Property, and Medical Products in the US
Healthcare System, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTHCARE LAW 637 (I. Glenn
Cohen et al. eds., 2016). For an explanation of organized medicine’s role in setting
Medicare Part B payments, see Miriam J. Laugesen et al., In Setting Doctors’ Medicare
Fees, CMS Almost Always Accepts the Relative Value Update Panel’s Advice on Work Values,
31 HEATH AFF. 965, 968–70 (2012). The RUC is composed of 31 physician members
approved by the AMA, with 21 nominated by major national medical specialty
societies. AM. MED. ASS’N, The RVS Update Committee (2014), http://www.amaassn.org/ama/pub/physicianresources/solutions-managing-your-practice/codingbilling-insurance/medicare/the-resource-based-relative-value-scale/the-rvs-updatecommittee.page [http://perma.cc/FN3D-LAUC] (overview of RUC composition).
64 See John D. Blum et al., The Hospital-Physician Relationship, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
U.S. HEALTHCARE LAW 512 (I. Glenn Cohen et al. eds., 2016).
65 Id.
63
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practices, and pricing. 66 Moreover, state courts define most patient
rights and resolve most disputes over the quality of patient care—a
fragmented process that seldom attracts public attention and leaves
the vast majority of substandard care unexamined. 67
This fusion of professional protectionism and public subsidy
presumes that beneficent therapeutic relationships between
individual physicians and patients can be extrapolated to the
population level. No doubt this expectation was well-motivated and
had the virtue of incrementalism, but its cumulative effect on
fragmentation and waste over the course of several generations has
been profound. 68 Reliance on the physician-patient dyad has also
been expedient as a political strategy for larger reforms such as

Substantive federal regulation of health insurance has been incremental and
incomplete: The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA,
establishing limited rights upon termination of employment), the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA, mainly regulating the small-group
insurance market), and the ACA. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Access to Health Insurance
and Health Benefits, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTHCARE LAW 147 (I. Glenn
Cohen et al. eds., 2016).
67 See Barry R. Furrow, Medical Malpractice Liability: Of Modest Expansions and Tightening
Standards, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTHCARE LAW 421 (I. Glenn Cohen et al.
eds., 2016); A. Russell Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Adverse
Events Due to Negligence: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study III, 325 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 245, 248 (1991) (estimating that less than 2% of adverse events due to
negligence result in malpractice claims.); William M. Sage et al., Use of Non-Disclosure
Agreements in Medical Malpractice Settlements by a Large Academic Health System, 175
JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1130 (2015) (documenting the high frequency of non-disclosure
agreements in malpractice tort settlements).
68 See Einer Elhauge, Why We Should Care about Health Care Fragmentation and How to
Fix It, in THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE: CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS (E.
Elhauge ed., 2010): 1–20. For an overview of associated legal issues, see William M.
Sage & Robert F. Leibenluft, Overcoming Barriers to Collaboration and Alignment: Legal
and Regulatory Issues, in PHYSICIAN-HOSPITAL INTEGRATION 110–40 (Francis J. Crosson
& Laura Tollen eds., 2010)).
66
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Medicare, neutralizing potentially powerful grass-roots opposition
from the medical profession and its allies President Lyndon
Johnson’s memorable declaration when told the (as it turned, grossly
understated) $500-million-over-ten-years price tag of accepting the
AMA’s final package of demands in exchange for withdrawing
opposition to Medicare—“Is that all? Do it. Move that damn bill out
now, before we lose it!”—should be engraved on each nail it placed
in the coffin of national fiscal responsibility. 69
Barriers to new competition were erected under the assumption
that physician control is desirable, but routinely tempt favored
stakeholders to engage in rent-seeking through both private activity
and politics. Privately, large insurers and prominent hospitals have
a mutual interest in preserving their positions that chills innovation
and may even subvert hard bargaining over cost or quality. 70
Politically, stakeholders of various types hide behind the health care
system’s foundational architecture of professional privilege while
exerting influence at all levels of government, from the
pharmaceutical and insurance industries’ lobbying muscle with
Congress to the local influence of hospitals that are dominant
employers in many communities. Moreover, industry groups often
enjoy support from demand-side constituencies with strong interests
in maintaining collective subsidies, including not only America’s

JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE REVOLUTION: WHO LIVES, WHO DIES,
WHO PAYS? 52(1986); see also William M. Sage, Fraud and Abuse Law, 281 JAMA 1179
(1999).
70 See Scott Allen & Marcella Bombardieri, A Handshake that Made Healthcare History,
BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 28, 2008), https://www.bostonglobe.com/specials/2008/12/28/ha
ndshake-that-made-healthcare-history/QiWbywqb8olJsA3IZ11o1H/story.html
(describing the decision by Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts to pay very high
prices to Partners Healthcare). See generally William M. Sage, Assembled Products: The
Key to More Effective Competition and Antitrust Oversight in Health Care, 101 CORNELL L.
REV. 609 (2016).
69
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rising population of seniors but also smaller groups concerned
primarily with a particular medical condition or set of services.
In this manner, accreted health law has conferred a significant
degree of immunity on health care from competitive and corporate
pressures that have transformed other industries:
(1) Professional licensing laws truncate the conventional
relationship between price and quality, prohibiting the sale
of less expensive non-physician medical services while
simultaneously curtailing commercial accountability for
price and quality in connection with market transactions in
favor of threshold barriers to entry and a veneer of
professional self-policing.71
(2) Ready access to admitting and procedural privileges at
community hospitals, along with independent billing for
other on-demand resources, enables physicians to specialize
and prosper with minimal capital investment in their own
practices.
(3) The Joint Commission and other self-regulatory bodies on
which government depends to survey and certify health

Cf. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 149–59 (1962) (“I am . . . persuaded
that [restrictive] licensure has reduced both the quantity and quality of medical
practice; . . . that it has forced the public to pay more for less satisfactory medical
service, and that it has retarded technological development both in medicine itself and
in the organization of medical practice.”). This is no longer a fringe view. See OFFICE
OF ECON. POLICY ET AL., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A
FRAMEWORK FOR POLICYMAKERS 13–14 (July 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.ar
chives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/licensing_report_final_nonembargo.pdf
(Obama administration report documenting inefficiency and unfairness associated
with occupational licensing); Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name:
Should Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093 (2014).
71
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facilities often set standards that minimally scrutinize
physician behavior.72
(4) Physicians’ legal prerogative to authorize third parties to
bill patients’ health insurance in connection with
prescriptions, orders for services, and referrals inherent in
the “practice of medicine” inflates and distorts prices for care
inputs and attenuates incentives to deliver care efficiently.
(5) In several states, including California and Texas,
prohibitions on the corporate practice of medicine constrain
the corporate forms of health care businesses and may
restrict access to capital in both the professional and facility
subsectors.73
(6) “Fraud and abuse” concerns over potential corruption of
professional judgment in connection with Medicare and
Medicaid contracting practices misalign incentives and
perpetuate the fragmentation of care delivery. 74

See Medical Staff (CAMH/Hospitals), THE JOINT COMM’N (Mar. 10, 2011), http://
www.jointcommission.org/mobile/standards_information/jcfaqdetails.aspx?Standa
rdsFAQId=435&StandardsFAQChapterId=74
[http://perma.cc/9DAB-LFZQ];
Benefits of Joint Commission Accreditation, THE JOINT COMM’N (Aug. 28, 2015),
http://www.jointcommission.org/benefits_of_joint_commission_accreditation/
[https://web.archive.org/web/20150906064510/http://www.jointcommission.org/
benefits_of_joint_commission_accreditation/]. See generally James S. Roberts et al., A
History of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, 258 JAMA 936 (1987).
73 See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 2400, 2052 (West 2012) (regulations providing
that corporations cannot have professional licenses and requiring physicians to have
a license in order to practice medicine); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. §§ 155.001, 155.003,
157.001, 164.052, 165.156 (West 2012) (regulations on physician licensing and
corporation’s ability to hire physicians).
74 See generally Joan K. Krause, Integration, Fragmentation, and Human Nature: The Role of
the Fraud and Abuse Laws in a Changing Healthcare System, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
U.S. HEALTHCARE LAW, at 852 (I. Glenn Cohen et al. eds., 2016). For earlier critiques of
the antifraud regime’s conflicting demands on health care delivery, see James F.
Blumstein, The Fraud and Abuse Statute in an Evolving Health Care Marketplace: Life in the
72
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(7) Consumer protection in health care does less to prevent
and redress fraud than to maintain dependence on
physicians and discourage informed self-help, which
elsewhere in American commerce is considered the
preferred path to both autonomy and efficiency.
The incoherence of health care products and services compared
to other commercial contexts—and the fact that such incoherence has
all but gone unnoticed—shows how pervasive law-driven market
distortions have become. In advanced industries serving consumers,
products are almost universally delivered fully assembled, generally
with a warranty for performance as expected. By contrast, the health
care system trades in physician-led process steps that can be assigned
a billing code and “reimbursed,” along with isolated inputs to
professional processes. Health insurance “benefit packages” are
loose assemblages of these process steps and inputs, grouped in ways
that obscure the purposes that might be served by offering them in
combination and disclaiming any responsibility for combining them
effectively.
Products or services assembled to meet consumers’ intuitive
needs are rare, and warranty-style accountability for failing
consumer expectations is rarer still.75 Even Medicare’s new “bundled
payment” initiatives tend to proxy assembly rather than actually
demanding it—kind of like paying for all the things that experts say

Health Care Speakeasy, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 205 (1996); David A. Hyman, Health Care
Fraud and Abuse: Market Change, Social Norms, and the Trust “Reposed in the Workmen,”
30 J. LEGAL STUD. 531 (2001).
75 For a detailed discussion of the effects of regulation on the health care “product,”
see Sage, supra note 69; William M. Sage, Getting the Product Right: How Competition
Policy Can Improve Health Care Markets. 33 HEALTH AFF. 1076 (2014).
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should go into making a television set but not simply buying a
television set.76
Most perniciously, accreted regulation and professional selfregulation have distorted innovation itself, which is the engine of
change over the longer term. Although process innovation has finally
begun in earnest, the last several decades of medical innovation have
mainly involved reimbursable technologies that fit existing, flawed
methods of production and therefore that have tended to increase
costs without dramatically improving health outcomes.77 As Lewis
Thomas noted long ago, “definitive technologies” that prevent or
cheaply cure disease are few and far between.78 Moreover, medical
innovations have almost always been conceptualized as extensions
of the physician’s economically capacious if now merely
metaphorical “black bag”—reinforcing professional intermediation
in the receipt of health care rather than freeing the public from it. A
new technology not attached to a physician (or to a technician for
whom a physician or health facility catering to physicians can bill)
will likely go unused in the current regulatory and payment
environment.
Basic science investment by government remains strong, but the
“translational science” that has come into vogue to compete with it
for funding tends to center on care delivery in academic health

See Susan Delbanco, The Payment Reform Landscape: Bundled Payment, HEALTH AFF.
BLOG, (July 2, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/07/02/the-payment-reform
-landscape-bundled-payment; Robert E. Mechanic, Mandatory Medicare Bundled
Payment—Is It Ready for Prime Time?, 373 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1291 (2015).
77 James C. Robinson, Biomedical Innovation in the Era of Health Care Spending Constraints,
34 HEALTH AFF. 203 (2015) (arguing that the era of “cost-unconscious” innovation is
finally over). See also Clayton M. Christensen, Disruptive Innovation (2015),
http://www.claytonchristensen.com/key-concepts/ (describing a process by which
a product or service takes root initially at the bottom of a market and then moves up
market displacing established competitors).
78 LEWIS THOMAS, THE LIVES OF A CELL: NOTES OF A BIOLOGY WATCHER, 5–42 (1978).
76
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centers, which are hardly exemplars of efficiency or accountability.
“Precision medicine” may eventually link molecular characteristics
to personalized treatment protocols, but in the short term seems
more likely to bolster regressive arguments for costly, customized
production models.79 Even health information technology (HIT) has
struggled, despite generous federal support to promote supply (the
Bush approach) and incentivize demand (the Obama approach). 80
Real advances in HIT have been stymied by traditions of collecting
health care information primarily to get paid and not to improve
production processes; a paucity of users (other than large hospitals)
who are willing to expend their own capital on HIT; and an aging
generation of physician and hospital leaders who—like the
matriarchs of Midwest farm families who wanted a “horseless
carriage” rather than an automobile—understand HIT more as
paperless medical records than as an integrated production
management system.
III. FRACKING HEALTH CARE: THE QUEST TO FIND AND RELEASE
TRAPPED VALUE
Barely more than ten years ago, it was deemed impossible that
the U.S. could achieve energy independence. A technology—
horizontal hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking”—was capable of
harvesting vast but previously inaccessible shale gas deposits that
are located in many parts of the country, but the economic and

Francis S. Collins & Harold Varmus, A New Initiative on Precision Medicine, 372 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 793 (2015).
80 See generally INST. OF MED., HEALTH IT AND PATIENT SAFETY: BUILDING SAFER
SYSTEMS FOR BETTER CARE 19 (2012).
79
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political conditions were not conducive to disseminating it. 81 Once
these conditions changed, the trapped value could be, and was,
rapidly released. The benefits of fracking are undeniable, although
they are offset by potential dangers both short-term (groundwater
contamination, local seismic activity) and long (disincentives to
develop cleaner, renewable energy sources).82
The most important question with respect to the value trapped
in U.S. health care is not whether it should be released, but how.
Applying a fracking analogy to the health care system focuses
attention on the key issues. What are the key technologies and skills?
What political and economic conditions will result in their
deployment? To whom will the benefits accrue? And what might
possibly go wrong?
A promising sign is that health care opinion-makers now
understand the vastness of their medicalized reserves, and have
made a consensus commitment to recovering the value trapped
within them. Over the past two decades, the policy understanding of
high health system expenditure has shifted from an assumption of
necessity to a recognition of waste. In his 1994 book, Medicine’s
Dilemmas: Infinite Needs Versus Finite Resources, William Kissick
asserted that “no society in the world has ever been—or will ever be
—able to afford providing all the health services its population is
capable of utilizing."83 Accordingly, he conceived of health policy as
an “iron triangle” delimiting the trade-offs that would become
necessary—through explicit government rationing of access and/or
quality—if the nation wished to cap health care spending. Kissick’s

See generally RUSSELL GOLD, THE BOOM: HOW FRACKING IGNITED THE AMERICAN
ENERGY REVOLUTION AND CHANGED THE WORLD (2014) (offering a scientific and
economic history of hydraulic shale fracturing through the personal stories of those
involved).
82 See, e.g., Sari Kovats et al., The Health Implications of Fracking, 383 LANCET 757 (2014)
(explaining the limited evidence base for assessing fracking-related health risks).
83 WILLIAM KISSICK, MEDICINE’S DILEMMAS: INFINITE NEEDS VERSUS FINITE RESOURCES
48 (1994).
81
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book was written during the legislative debate over the Clinton
administration’s health reform plan, the first attempt in more than a
generation to universalize health insurance coverage. Following 25
years of persistent increases in health care costs, it was also the first
to consider the effects of expanded coverage both on medical
expenditures and—through higher taxation and government crowdout of private activity—on overall economic growth.
Kissick’s policy frame placed existing health care expenditures
on a Pareto frontier, making “guns or butter” tradeoffs necessary. But
what if health care was just massively inefficient? By the time the
Obama administration’s health reform plan took shape a generation
later, extensive evidence challenged not only the high cost of
conventional health care but also its quality and safety, as well as
raising dire warnings about the long-term economic implications of
rapid increases in chronic disease and the inevitable aging of the U.S.
population. 84 Kissick’s iron triangle therefore gave way to another
triad, the “Triple Aim,” which was the brainchild of Harvard
pediatrician Donald Berwick and his colleagues at the Institute for
Healthcare Improvement. 85 The “Triple Aim” consists of (1)
improving the patient experience of care (including quality and
satisfaction), (2) improving the health of populations, and (3)
reducing the per capita cost of health care. 86 In a striking contrast to

See, e.g., Steven H. Woolf & Laudan Y. Aron, The US Health Disadvantage Relative to
Other High–Income Countries, 309 JAMA 771, 772 (2013) (comparing Americans’ health
to that of other countries of similar economic status).
85 IHI Triple Aim Initiative, INST. FOR HEALTHCARE IMPROVEMENT (2015), http://
www.ihi.org/Engage/Initiatives/TripleAim/pages/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 8,
2016).
86 Id.
84
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Kissick’s tragic choices, Berwick implies that all three parts of the
Triple Aim can be achieved simultaneously.
The Triple Aim was the outgrowth of decades of research
documenting costly variability in clinical medicine with
overinvestment in specialized services and corresponding neglect of
primary care and prevention.87 The Triple Aim altered health policy
thinking in two critical respects. First, it took the existing health care
system off the Pareto frontier, making the crux of policy debate
productive efficiency rather than rationing. 88 The concept of “valuebased health care,” which hardly registered as a health policy
objective in the 1990s, is now universally praised if not always wholeheartedly pursued. 89
Second, and relatedly, it emphasized
incremental improvement on a decentralized basis, the urgency

Substantial, unexpected geographic variations in medical treatment were not
associated with either greater health care needs or superior clinical outcomes.
Understanding of the Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Health Care System, DARTMOUTH
ATLAS HEALTH CARE (2015), http://www.dartmouthatlas.org (last visited Apr. 17,
2017).
88 A compelling example pitting preventive services for populations against rescue
treatment for individuals resulted in transplant pioneer Thomas Starzl’s move from
Colorado to Pennsylvania. Richard D. Lamm, Doctors Have Patients, Governors Have
Citizens, 19 HEALTH AFF. 173 (2000). Similarly, the controversy over Oregon’s Medicaid
“rationing” plan in the early 1990s obscured the fact that its cost-benefit calculations
were based on existing production and pricing models. See Jonathan Oberlander et al.,
Rationing Medical Care: Rhetoric and Reality in the Oregon Health Plan, 164 CANADIAN
MED. ASS’N J. 1583 (2001).
89 When a young management consultant and I proposed “health care value” as the
platform for a major gubernatorial candidate in 1994, the reaction was bemused
puzzlement. This has changed. According to experts in health care management:
“There is no longer any doubt about how to increase the value of care.” Michael E.
Porter & Thomas H. Lee, The Strategy That Will Fix Health Care, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct.
2013), https://hbr.org/2013/10/the-strategy-that-will-fix-health-care. The standard
toolkit for pursuing value includes measuring costs and outcomes, expecting payment
only for successful care, building “integrated practice units,” and embracing health
information technology. See generally MICHAEL E. PORTER & ELIZABETH O. TEISBERG,
REDEFINING HEALTH CARE: CREATING VALUE-BASED COMPETITION ON RESULTS (2006).
87
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having receded to achieve a definitive political settlement balancing
access, cost, and quality.
Where the Triple Aim may fall short is in its expectation that
population health can be substantially improved within a medical
framework. 90 Its explicit integration of individual and population
health goals was a reminder that rendering cost-be-damned care to
patients with generous insurance can represent an abdication of
medical ethics rather than a fulfillment of it. 91 At the same time,
however, research continues to reveal that fundamental drivers of ill
health and premature death—poverty, inequality, racism, etc.—are
more amenable to non-medical social interventions, and that
developed nations whose health care spending is dwarfed by that in
the United States invest instead in such services. 92
Accepting this re-conceptualization, and propelled by the
urgency that accompanies stagnant wages, lack of broad-based

Many new forms of health care organization contemplate population engagement,
with varying degrees of commitment to social services. See, e.g., Steven M. Shortell &
Lawrence P. Casalino, Health Care Reform Requires Accountable Care Systems, 300 JAMA
95 (2008) (explaining the ACO model); .H. S. Luft, Becoming Accountable—Opportunities
and Obstacles for ACOs, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED 1389 (2010) (same); JEREMY CANTOR ET
AL., COMMUNITY-CENTERED HEALTH HOMES: BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN HEALTH
SERVICES
AND
COMMUNITY
PREVENTION,
https://www.preventioninstitut
e.org/sites/default/files/publications/HE_Cmty-centered%20health%20homes_032
311.pdf; Marsha Regenstein et al., The State of the Medical-Legal Partnership Field (2017),
http://medical-legalpartnership.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/2016-MLPSurvey-Report.pdf.
91 Cf. Tom Lehrer, “Wernher von Braun” (“ ’Once the rockets are up, who cares where
they come down? That's not my department,’ says Wernher von Braun”).
92 See BRADLEY & TAYLOR, supra note 8. International comparisons of health care
system performance generally place the United States at or near the bottom. See ERIC
C. SCHNEIDER ET AL., MIRROR, MIRROR 2017: INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON REFLECTS
FLAWS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR BETTER U.S. HEALTH CARE (Commonwealth Fund
2017), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/fund-rep
ort/2017/jul/schneider_mirror_mirror_2017.pdf.
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economic opportunity, and stunted social investments, how should
the U.S. frack its health care system? Among the key objectives:
•

Eliminating
middlemen
“reimbursable claims”

•

Disintermediating physicians from many treatment
processes

•

Enabling tech-savvy self-help

•

Making insurance subsidies transparent

•

Depopulating and reconstituting hospitals

•

Re-collectivizing health in patient groups and local
communities

who

profit

from

A detailed proposal is beyond the scope of this essay, but one can
identify the core elements and offer basic goals. Because health care
governance has played such a large role in trapping value,
redirecting governance is an essential aspect of recovering it.
Facilitated by re-regulation, a second aspect is restructuring the
health care industry, both in terms of financing (insurance) and care
delivery. A third aspect is the workforce, which is currently topheavy in specialization and expense, yet remote from the people to
be served and the needs to be met. Fourth is the nature of industry
output, which still favors physician habits and preferences over
demonstrable value to patients. Finally, repurposing trapped value
once recaptured requires a plan for investing the proceeds that have
been realized.
Because the challenge is to undo an accretion of law that
influences so many parts of the health care system, resetting
regulation to release value must be an evolutionary and adaptive
process rather than a revolutionary one. Part of the task is
conditioning change by adjusting expectations and incentives.
Another part, as with responsible fracking, is ensuring transparency
and accountability with respect to both finances and outcomes. In
general terms, initial steps would involve reducing collective
professional control over industry structure and performance,
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thereby unmasking large subsidies for the current health care sector
in order either to reduce them outright or, where health-oriented
redistribution remains justifiable, to draw public attention to the
need for cost control.
Barriers to competitive entry and practice innovation that are
erected by professionally dominated entities and organizations
should be exposed, scrutinized, and in most instances dismantled.
The Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in North Carolina State Bd. of
Dental Examiners v. F.T.C.,93 subjecting unsupervised state licensing
boards to federal antitrust law, provides one opening to begin this
interrogation. 94 Licensing restrictions, like state legal requirements
and Joint Commission standards for hospital-physician relations,
primarily influence competitive opportunities by constraining care
processes and imposing operational costs. Legal constraints that go
more to corporate structure, such as corporate practice of medicine
prohibitions, should also be revisited—as should those that impede
the free entry and exit of investment capital, such as certificate-ofneed laws for capital expansion that some states still enforce as well
as various legal obstacles to closing facilities (while maintaining
access to services in other ways).
Tax preferences for employer-sponsored health insurance,
criticized by health policy experts across the political spectrum but
still prized by workers who are unaware of how they crowd out
wages and increase waste, should finally be curtailed.95 By contrast,

135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015).
William M. Sage & David A. Hyman, Antitrust as Disruptive Innovation in Health Care:
Can Limiting State Action Immunity Help Save a Trillion Dollars?, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 724
(2017).
95 Although the politics are daunting, health economists of all political bents tend to
agree on both the inefficiency and unfairness of not taxing employer-provided health
93
94
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national fiscal commitments designated for specific purposes should
be clearly explained and wisely spent. For example, the Trump
administration seeks to repeal an estimated $346 billion over ten
years that the ACA collects in taxes from high earners to help offset
tax subsidies that enable low earners to purchase health insurance—
a substantial amount that, for misguided political reasons, has never
been publicized to its beneficiaries while those forced to pay it fail to
abstract from that responsibility any incentive to demand more
efficient health care delivery.96
In terms of industrial structure, many of the inefficiencies in
health care derive from a few basic patterns that require disruption
through legal change and parallel industrial innovation. One
example is the American hospital. Although acute care
hospitalization has shifted from a residential and recuperative
experience to a time-limited and intensive one, hospital care still
consists largely of people in beds (“in-patients”) being assessed for
needs and delivered goods or services on an itemized basis. 97
Because of this ad hoc, “blank-check” approach (at least to insured
patients), many hospitals remain bloated enterprises compared with
other industrial sites. Another example is how people with health
care needs collect information, products and services piecemeal in a
series of B2C (business to consumer) transactions, with each step

coverage. See, e.g., Joseph Antos, End the Exclusion for Employer-Provided Health Care,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/04/14
/the-worst-tax-breaks/end-the-exemption-for-employer-provided-health-care.
96 See Tony Nitti, In Amended Health Care Bill, GOP Doubles Down on Tax Breaks for the
Rich, Reduced Medicaid Funding, FORBES (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.forbes
.com/sites/anthonynitti/2017/03/22/in-amended-health-care-bill-gop-doublesdown-on-tax-breaks-for-the-rich-reduced-medicaid-funding/#6b7d6a6c6b7d.
97 See Erin C. Fuse Brown, Irrational Hospital Pricing, 14 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 11
(2014); Steven Brill, Bitter Pill: How Outrageous Pricing and Egregious Profits Are
Destroying Our Healthcare, TIME, Mar. 4, 2013, at 24–26.
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beset by administrative frictions, delays, and uncertainties. 98 Access
points for this care almost always include or are endorsed by
physicians, but coordination is uncommon. 99 In particular, little
happens in the background as B2B (business to business)
transactions, with customization receding in favor of economies of
scale, batch processing, and established commercial relationships. 100
Meaningful improvement would refine the health system’s
output in at least three respects. First, reversing a century or more of
elaborate design to discourage self-help, people would be able to
recognize and address the majority of their own health care needs.
Second, most complex medical services would be offered fully
assembled for a clear price known in advance. Third, accountability
would be oriented more closely to the quality and safety of the
specific services received, including warranties, and less to the
general reputations of physicians or facilities.
The workforce issues in fracking health care are both fascinating
and daunting, in that health care employment must shift to a
different model to be simultaneously effective, affordable, and
sustainable. As discussed above, health care is one of the few
domestic industries with continuing employment growth, many
high-wage jobs with generous benefits, and many workplaces. But
health care is so productively and allocatively inefficient that many
of these jobs are plausibly unnecessary. 101 Successfully converting

See PORTER & TEISBERG, supra note 89, at 4.
Id.
100 See REGINA HERZLINGER, MARKET-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES
IN THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA'S LARGEST SERVICE INDUSTRY 158 (1997) (coining
and explaining the phrase “focused factory”).
101 Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, The Health Care Jobs Fallacy, 366 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 2433, 2433 (2012) (“It is tempting to think that rising health care employment
is a boon, but if the same outcomes can be achieved with lower employment and fewer
98
99
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the employment base of health care to a sounder footing could offer
valuable lessons for American society more generally as automation
accelerates, off-shore production grows, and significant numbers of
people find themselves not only deprived of large paychecks with
benefits, but also in need of fulfilling work to occupy their time and
assist their communities.102
An unexpected aspect of labor transformation in health care is
that lower-income jobs may be less rather than more vulnerable. A
more efficient health care system will still need technicians to
maintain and operate advanced medical technology that is applied
directly to patients in dedicated clinical settings. Some of these
individuals will be craftspeople, while others will adhere strictly to
protocols. The health care system also will need human
representatives spread widely through communities to engage
people in promoting and regaining health where they live, work,
learn, and play. And it will need carers—compassion, connection,
and love being qualities that remain impossible to automate or
outsource en masse. 103 With sufficient investment in education and
development, the employment base in health care will still be
substantial.
Which jobs are the most vulnerable? Surprisingly, it may be those
of physicians, making it essential to retool medical education so as to
emphasize careers in management and innovation and policy in

resources, that leaves extra money to devote to other important public and private
priorities such as education, infrastructure, food, shelter, and retirement savings.”).
102 See, e.g., Arthur Garson et al., A New Corps of Trained Grand-Aides Has the Potential to
Extend Reach of Primary Care Workforce and Save Money, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1016 (2012).
103 Many commentators, including leaders in the technical measurement of health care
quality, have come to emphasize caring relationships as the most enduring quality of
human employment. See, e.g., Donald M. Berwick, Era 3 for Medicine and Health Care,
315 JAMA 1329 (2016); Fitzhugh Mullan, A Founder of Quality Assessment Encounters a
Troubled System Firsthand, 29 HEALTH AFF. 137, 141 (2000) (according to quality pioneer
Avedis Donabedian, “The secret of quality is love.”).
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addition to direct service to patients. 104 Technology today is
increasingly able to recognize patterns, access voluminous facts, and
generate recommendations for action. 105 Much as highly paid
lawyers have been supplanted in many practice settings by less
expensive legal services personnel using information and
communication resources, physicians may find themselves replaced
by clinical staff who are less extensively qualified but more
numerous and manageable. If physicians’ self-protective licensing
barriers fall, substantial numbers of these replacements will be other
professionals, such as advanced practice nurses, pharmacists, and
clinical social workers. An even larger cadre, however, will likely
consist of “trained observers” who use decision support
technologies, with expert back-up if needed, to assist individuals in
caring for themselves.
Finally, the financial proceeds of successful industry
restructuring should be diffused widely rather than appropriated by
a privileged few. The most powerful effects would be to boost
general wages by reducing the cost to private employers of
compensating workers through health benefits, and to free up public
resources currently invested in health for other uses. But a substantial
amount of targeted public investment is also necessary, specifically

Scholars have begun to speculate on the job-killing potential of new health
technologies. See, e.g., Fazal Khan, The 'Uberization' of Healthcare: The Forthcoming Legal
Storm over Mobile Health Technology's Impact on the Medical Profession, 26 HEALTH
MATRIX 123 (2016).
105 As the word suggests, “disrupting” health care will not be a smooth process. But it
is under way for both profit and social contribution. For example, the Peterson Center
on Healthcare is “a non-profit organization dedicated to making higher quality, more
affordable healthcare a reality for all Americans [that] is working to transform U.S.
healthcare into a high-performance system by finding innovative solutions that
improve quality and lower costs, and accelerating their adoption on a national scale.”
About the Peterson Center on Healthcare, PETERSON CTR. ON HEALTHCARE,
https://petersonhealthcare.org/about-us (last visited Nov. 8, 2017).
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in education and social services that can ameliorate adverse social
determinants of health more successfully than can be done by the
health care system.
CONCLUSION
As this essay has explained, the United States is overmedicalized. President Eisenhower warned in 1961 that a militaryindustrial complex presented social, political, and economic risks of
perpetual militarization; our medical-industrial complex has actually
brought to fruition an analogous situation of perpetual
medicalization. We must therefore turn our innovative energies, and
our public policies, in a different direction.
At the same time, the essay has depicted U.S. health care as an
industry that has failed to modernize, despite its reputation for
advanced science and technological prowess. Whether health care is
perceived primarily as a professional domain, a social right, an
intimate personal need, or a flawed market, it also seems to be the
last sector of post-war America whose economic transformation is
now long overdue. Our challenge in recovering the massive
resources currently trapped in the health care system is to avoid
worsening economic inequality or social alienation. Instead, we must
develop and execute a plan for recovering value and repurposing
resources that enhances human capital and helps rebuild
communities and American society as a whole.

